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1. Introduction1
It has historically been argued that what is deemed to constitute just and proportionate 
punishment in a particular case can legitimately produce different answers in different 
countries, and even in the same country2 in the light of changing social, cultural and 
political factors. The formulation of penal policy has long been considered inherent in 
the concept of national sovereignty and thus as falling within the exclusive domain of do-
mestic democratic debate and decision-making. Arguments of this nature are currently 
being relied upon in the ongoing reformulation of European penal policy in the light of 
the terrorist threat facing the continent, for example in relation to whether to expand the 
actus reus to what are considered acts tending to create a risk of future terrorist activity. 
However, these arguments may be considered to be in tension with an individualistic and 
dignitarian conception of human rights. Such a conception is rooted in the philosophical 
*          Judge of the European Court of Human Rights and Professor of Law, University of Iceland 
(on leave).
1 This article is based on a lecture given on 26 October 2016 at the Faculty of Law, University 
of Bergen, as the 2016 Bergen Lecture on Criminal Law and Criminal Justice. The analysis 
presented reflects my personal viewpoint and should not in any way be understood as 
reflecting the views of the European Court of Human Rights or other judges of the Court. 
I thank my very talented and able legal assistant, Ms Sabina Garahan, for her contribution 
in the research and drafting process.
2 R v. Oakes and others [2012] EWCA Crim 2435, § 6. 
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doctrines of liberalism that underpin international human rights norms, such as Article 3 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, which prohibits torture and other forms 
of inhuman or degrading punishments, as well as Article 5, which prohibits dispropor-
tionate and arbitrary deprivations of liberty, both of which have been examined in depth 
in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: the Court or the 
Strasbourg Court).
To elaborate further on this thesis, this article seeks to articulate the underlying doc-
trinal premises of the case-law of the Strasbourg Court in the field of criminal justice, in 
particular on the use of imprisonment in sentencing as formulated in the seminal Grand 
Chamber judgment of 2013 in the case of Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom.3 
For these purposes, I will proceed in two parts. First, I will examine the individual, as 
well as interconnected, components in the reasoning of the Strasbourg Court in Vinter 
and Others and analyse the Court’s argumentation in the light of the Court’s case-law on 
deprivations of liberty in general. I will seek to demonstrate that, viewed conceptually, 
the Court’s underlying premise is that deprivation of liberty, when viewed through the 
lens of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, requires an enlightened, rational and propor-
tional application of national criminal laws and rules of criminal procedure in conformi-
ty with the overarching principle of human dignity, which forms one of the cornerstones 
of the Convention system. In other words, it is not open to democratic societies within 
the Council of Europe system to impose punishment in the form of incarceration for 
criminal acts purely to satisfy the perceived democratic aim of retribution and condem-
nation by the populace. Nonetheless, due regard must be paid to the views of the latter, in 
accordance with the principle of majority rule decision-making in national parliaments.
In the second part of the article, I will discuss the very important procedural aspects 
of the Vinter judgment manifested in the so-called Vinter review of whole life prison 
sentences. In particular, the requirements of the review mechanism formulated in the 
case-law provide useful information on the conceptual nature of the Court’s approach in 
the area of penal policy and criminal justice. In this second part, and before I conclude, I 
will also venture to say a few words on the nature of the Court’s reliance on rehabilitation 
as the foundation of a dignitarian conception of European penal policy as well as on the 
extraterritorial reach of the Vinter and Others case-law.
3 Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 66069/09, 130/10 and 3896/10, 9 July 
2013.
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2. The Reasoning of the Court in Vinter and Others and the Conven-
tion Conception of Human Dignity
In the landmark Grand Chamber judgment of the European Court of Human Rights 
in Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom of 2013,4 the Court examined the system of 
‘whole life prisoners’ in the UK within the context of Article 3 of the Convention. The 
case concerned three applicants who, having been convicted of murder in separate crim-
inal proceedings, were serving mandatory sentences of life imprisonment. The applicants 
maintained that their life sentences without the possibility of parole violated Article 3 of 
the Convention which prohibits, as I mentioned above, torture and inhuman or degrad-
ing treatment or punishment. Before the case reached the Grand Chamber, a Chamber of 
seven judges of the Court had reached the conclusion, by a vote of four to three, that in 
the light of the then applicable case-law, the life sentences did not violate Article 3. The 
Grand Chamber, by an overwhelming majority of 16 votes to 1,5 disagreed and held that 
although no Article 3 breach could stem from the mere imposition or, indeed, full serv-
ing of a life term, so long as the sentence was de jure and de facto reducible, irreducible 
life sentences did amount to a breach of Article 3.6 Concluding that the UK system did 
not in fact provide with certainty the reducibility of a life sentence, the Grand Chamber 
consequently found a violation in all of the applicants’ cases.7
The Court based its reasoning, first, on grounds of ‘human dignity’, finding that the 
imposition of a life sentence could not be imposed without providing the offender with a 
‘prospect of release’.8 Second, the Court considered that an irreducible life sentence created 
a risk that the offender could ‘never atone for his offence’.9 Third, emphasis was placed on 
the argument that the balance between the different justifications, or so-called legitimate 
penological grounds for detention, namely punishment, deterrence, public protection and 
rehabilitation, was ‘not necessarily static and [might] shift in the course of a sentence’,10 and 
finally, that an irreducible life sentence was ‘a poor guarantee of just and proportionate 
punishment’.11
At its core, the Grand Chamber in Vinter found that certain substantive limits on a 
State’s power to punish offenders are inherent in the Article 3 prohibition on inhuman or 
4 Ibid. 
5 Judge Villiger partly dissented predominantly on the grounds that the Court should have 
undertaken a more concrete and individualised assessment of each applicant’s situation. 
6 Vinter and Others, § 121.
7 Ibid. § 130.
8 Ibid. § 110. 
9 Ibid. § 112.
10 Ibid. § 111. 
11 Ibid. § 112.
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degrading treatment or punishment, this finding being primarily based on the recogni-
tion of the human dignity of all offenders. No matter their crimes, they should be ‘given 
the opportunity to rehabilitate themselves while serving their sentences, with the prospect 
of eventually functioning again as responsible members of a free society’.12 The Court thus 
considered it axiomatic that a prisoner cannot be detained unless there are ‘legitimate pe-
nological grounds’13 for the detention, placing interestingly particular emphasis on reha-
bilitation, based in large part on European penal policy.14 This element was further clar-
ified in the recent Grand Chamber judgment in Murray v. the Netherlands15 which I will 
shortly return to. For now, I will focus on the Court’s reliance on the principle of human 
dignity as a Convention-based limitation on member States’ democratic and sovereign 
rights to formulate their domestic penal policy in accordance with domestic traditions 
and popular opinion. 
Although this may cause some disagreement, I would submit that there is nothing 
in and of itself politically and morally shocking about a State deciding by legislative 
enactment that the most serious of crimes should be met with life imprisonment without 
any chance of parole. For example, I suspect that few would have criticised Norway for 
having in place criminal legislation in 2011 that would have allowed the perpetrator of 
the mass killings in the Regjeringskvartalet in Oslo and on the island of Utøya on 22 July 
to face life imprisonment without any chance of parole.16 
Two questions consequently arise. First, what is it in the prohibition of inhuman or 
degrading punishment under Article 3 of the Convention that the Strasbourg Court 
seems to rely upon when finding that life sentences have to be de jure and de facto reduc-
ible – in other words, that all criminal offenders, no matter how depraved and serious 
their crimes are, must be afforded the ability to atone for their offences and have access 
to a system that provides some prospect of release at a future date? The second question 
is, how do the Court’s underlying doctrinal premises in its argumentation square with 
its general use of the principle of proportionality as a methodological tool when dealing 
12 Van Zyl Smit, Weatherby and Creighton, Whole Life Sentences and the Tide of European 
Human Rights Jurisprudence: What is to be Done? 14(1) Human Rights Law Review 
(2014) pp. 59-84, at 65.
13 Vinter and Others, § 111.
14 See Vinter and Others, § 115, citing in particular Rule 6 of the European Prison Rules, 
which provides that all detention shall be managed so as to facilitate the reintegration 
into free society of persons who have been deprived of their liberty, and Rule 102.1, which 
provides that the prison regime for sentenced prisoners shall be designed to enable them 
to lead a responsible and crime-free life.
15 Murray v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 10511/10, 26 April 2016. 
16 See, for instance, O’Neil, Norway terror suspect could get more than maximum sentence: 
prosecutor, National Post (2011) <http://news.nationalpost.com/news/norway-terror-
suspect-could-get-more-than-maximum-sentence-prosecutor> (accessed 30 October 
2016).
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with complaints directed at deprivations of liberty in the member States, both under Ar-
ticles 3 and 5 of the Convention?
As to the first question, I think it is useful to highlight at the outset that Article 3, 
like other Convention rights and freedoms, is an individual right. As such, and to use a 
metaphor, the universe of the Convention is composed of human beings, autonomous 
conscious living entities that are, as a matter of principle, to be revered by society and 
protected due to the mere yet inescapable fact of their very humanity. The actions or inac-
tions of human beings, even the senseless murder of another, are external manifestations 
of faulty or even morally repugnant decision-making, but such acts cannot, by definition, 
deprive the perpetrator of his or her humanity, or of the dignity that is its foundation. A 
punishment within the terms of Article 3 is thus inhuman if both its substance and its 
purpose clearly demonstrate that the punishment is imposed without paying heed to the 
human being’s, the perpetrator’s, humanity; the punishment itself reflecting the inescap-
able conclusion of both the criminal justice system and society that he is not worthy of 
human dignity. 
In other words, one can view the Strasbourg Court’s underlying message in the Vinter 
judgment through the prism of an autonomy-based, classical liberal conception of digni-
ty that holds that the individual has ‘intrinsic worth.’17 In this way, the Court makes clear 
that punishments that only serve purposes or aims wholly external to the human being, 
that disregard his or her humanity by reducing them merely to a subject of punishment, 
are by definition inhuman within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. That is 
why it may be argued that it is self-evident that the death penalty can never be considered 
a humane punishment – it is, after all, the ultimate manifestation of society’s carefully 
premeditated decision to extinguish the very essence of a person’s humanity. Similarly, 
the life-long incarceration of a person, for a criminal offence, without any possibility of 
parole, can in the same way in substance be described as a ‘death penalty in disguise’,18 
to borrow the words of Pope Francis, or, in the words famously expressed by the British 
judge Lord Justice Laws in the Wellington case referred to by the Strasbourg Court in 
Vinter, with a life sentence, ‘the supposed inalienable value of the prisoner’s life is reduced, 
merely, to his survival: to nothing more than his drawing breath and being kept, no doubt, 
17 Dyer, Irreducible Life Sentences: What Difference have the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the United Kingdom Human Rights Act Made? 16(3) Human Rights 
Law Review (2016), pp. 541-584, at 553.
18 Pope Francis, Address of Pope Francis to the Delegates of the International Association 
of Penal Law, 23 October 2012, cited in: Abellán Almenara and Van Zyl Smit, Human 
Dignity and Life Imprisonment: The Pope Enters the Debate, 15(2) Human Rights Law 
Review (2015) pp. 369-376, at 369.
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confined in decent circumstances. That is to pay lipservice to the value of life; not to vouch-
safe it’.19  
Furthermore, if one proceeds by analysing the Strasbourg Court’s case-law from a 
pure policy perspective, one might also argue that the Court is providing an effective 
human rights-oriented safeguard within Article 3 to so-called ‘penal populism’, which 
spurs the introduction of ‘much ill-considered and irrational criminal justice legislation 
in western democracies,’20 a manifestation of the attempts made by some governments to 
‘appease public opinion and to persuade the community that something is being done to 
protect it from crime’.21
To be fair and complete, there is certainly a counter-argument to be made to the 
Court’s dignitarian rationale in Vinter that I have now outlined, which merits a discus-
sion. This argument, which can be termed the justificatory conception of Article 3 pro-
tections,22 is based on the perhaps more pragmatic recognition that the imposition of 
punishments in the form of deprivation of liberty must be seen in a fact-specific context 
where the national authorities are allowed more leeway in striking a balance between the 
interests of the offender, and his or her human dignity, and the wider interests of society 
as crystallised in the sufferings of the victim or victims, also human beings deserving of 
respect. Under this justificatory conception of Article 3 there must then be room for a 
democratically elected legislature to define the most serious of crimes as being worthy 
of lifelong incarceration primarily based on the principle of retribution. In other words, 
19 R (Wellington) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin), 
§ 39. On appeal from the High Court, Lord Hoffmann in the House of Lords notably 
rejected Lord Justice Laws’ reasoning that ‘the abolition of the death penalty must have 
been founded upon the premise that the life of every person has such inalienable value that 
its forfeiture cannot be justified on the ground of retributive punishment’ (R (Wellington) 
v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 72, § 7), instead citing ‘more 
pragmatic’ grounds such as irreversibility in cases of miscarriages of justice, sparse 
evidence of its deterrent effect and the degrading and ‘ghastly ceremony of execution’. The 
parallels drawn by Lord Justice Laws between the death penalty and life imprisonment 
without parole, for Lord Hoffmann, constitute the very reasons why life imprisonment has 
remained an available option in the handing down of sentences for the most severe cases 
that would have previously attracted the death penalty; it is ‘part of the price’ of agreeing 
to the abolition of the death penalty for those who object to it on the abovementioned 
pragmatic grounds. 
20 Dyer 2016 p. 1.
21 Dyer 2016 pp. 1-2.
22 This is termed the ‘justification/absoluteness puzzle’ in Mavronicola, Crime, Punishment 
and Article 3 ECHR: Puzzles and Prospects of Applying an Absolute Right in a Penal 
Context, 15(4) Human Rights Law Review (2015) pp. 721-743, at 732.
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under this rationale the dignitarian view must, so to speak, be relativised to some extent 
to take account of certain public interest justifications.23 
There is of course an immediate conceptual problem with the justificatory conception 
of Article 3 that has been identified by academic commentators,24 namely the difficult 
tension which arises in the application of any kind of a balancing analysis when dealing 
with a prohibition such as Article 3 that is couched in absolute terms. That very inter-
esting debate would merit an article in itself. For the time being, suffice it to say that the 
justificatory conception of Article 3 was, it seems, emphatically rejected by the Grand 
Chamber in Vinter and Others. It is clear from the judgment that a purely retributive pe-
nal purpose, a so-called lex talionis, for life sentences25 without the opportunity of parole, 
focused exclusively on the gravity of the act and its perceived commensurate punish-
ment, does not conform with Article 3 of the Convention.26
As mentioned above, there is a second conceptual question that arises within the con-
text of the Vinter and Others judgment, which is whether the Court’s underlying digni-
tarian conception of Article 3 is in conformity with its general use of the principle of pro-
portionality. The latter is employed by the Court as a methodological tool when dealing 
with complaints directed at deprivations of liberty in the member States.
In the reasoning in Vinter and Others, the Grand Chamber resorts to proportionali-
ty-type language in several paragraphs.27 Importantly, the Court begins by confirming its 
settled case-law that grossly disproportionate sentences will violate Article 3 of the Con-
vention;28 hence it is clear that the principle of proportionality is, as such, the contextual 
framework in which the Article 3 analysis takes place. The Court on this basis goes on 
to affirm that the Contracting States must remain free to impose life sentences on adult 
offenders for especially serious crimes such as murder; the imposition of such a sentence 
is not in itself prohibited by or incompatible with Article 3 or any other Article of the 
Convention.29
In other words, it cannot be claimed that a life sentence is, in and of itself, grossly 
disproportionate under Article 3 of the Convention, although the Court has recently 
23 Unlike some academic commentators, I would not necessarily equate this justificatory 
conception of Article 3 with the Court’s use of the principle of proportionality in case-law 
under the same provision, Mavronicola ibid.  at 733.
24 Ibid.
25 As per Lord Justice Laws in R (Wellington) [2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin), § 39.
26 See in this respect Vinter and Others, § 112 – ‘even when a whole life sentence is condign 
punishment at the time of its imposition, with the passage of time it becomes… a poor 
guarantee of just and proportionate punishment.’
27 See, in particular, ibid. § 112.
28 Ibid. § 102.
29 Ibid. § 106.
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been invited to take that step by some commentators.30 Moreover, in Vinter and Others, 
the Court refers approvingly to Lord Justice Laws’ dictum in the domestic High Court 
case of Wellington, where he stated that even when a whole life sentence is an appropri-
ate punishment at the time of its imposition, with the passage of time it becomes a ‘poor 
guarantee of proportionate punishment’.31
A strong argument can be made that Vinter and Others sits quite comfortably within 
the wider scope of the Court’s deprivation of liberty jurisprudence, in particular its Ar-
ticle 5 case-law on the legality of detention where the principle of proportionality is the 
overarching norm or methodological tool applied by the Court. It is true that the princi-
ple is perhaps applied in a different manner in Vinter and Others compared to other cases. 
Discrepancies may be seen in, for example, M v. Germany,32 which dealt with the ap-
plicant’s continued placement in preventive detention beyond the authorised maximum 
period, and in James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom,33 on the failure to provide re-
habilitative courses to prisoners which formed a pre-requisite for their release. However, 
the underlying premise is, I would submit, the same. 
The dignitarian conception of the human person, rooted in autonomy-based theo-
ries of classical liberalism, requiring that punishments serve an enlightened, rational and 
just purpose, lies at the core of both strands of case-law under Articles 3 and 5. In other 
words, the development of penal policy in the member States is restrained by the Stras-
bourg Court’s interpretation and application of the Convention, serving the ideal that 
human beings are capable of betterment. In this way, the Court embeds within the Con-
vention the wider prevailing European penal policy, emphasising the principle of atone-
ment and the fundamental rehabilitative aim of imprisonment, as initially proclaimed in 
the famous 1977 Life Imprisonment case in the German Federal Constitutional Court,34 
heavily relied upon by the Grand Chamber in Vinter and Others.35 
30 See for example Abellán Almenara and Van Zyl Smit 2015 p. 376.
31 R (Wellington) [2007] EWHC 1109 (Admin), § 39, as cited in Vinter and Others, § 112.
32 M v. Germany, no. 19359/04, 17 December 2009. 
33 James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom, nos. 25119/09, 57715/09 and 57877/09, 18 
September 2012.
34 Life Imprisonment case (lebenslange Freiheitsstrafe) of 21 June 1977, 45 BVerfGE 187. An 
English translation of extracts of the judgment is available in Kommers, The Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany, 2nd ed. (Duke University Press 1997) 
pp. 306-313.
35 Vinter and Others, § 113. 
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3. Procedural Requirements for Vinter Post-Conviction Review of 
Life Sentences, the Principle of Rehabilitation and the Extraterritorial 
Reach of Vinter and Others
I now turn to a discussion of the procedural requirements under the so-called Vinter 
post-conviction review of life sentences or, in other words, the question of what kind of 
system of possible release is required at the domestic level to warrant a finding that the 
life sentence imposed is de facto and de jure reducible and thus in conformity with Ar-
ticle 3 of the Convention. In this part, I will also say a few words about the principle of 
rehabilitation of offenders, as set out in Vinter and Others and then clarified in the recent 
Grand Chamber judgment in Murray v. the Netherlands,36 as well as briefly addressing the 
Court’s case-law on the extraterritorial reach of the Vinter and Others case-law.
As I mentioned at the outset, in Vinter and Others, the power of a domestic court to 
impose life sentences was not in itself in question.37 The Grand Chamber made clear that, 
where prisoners serving such sentences continued to pose a risk to society, they could be 
detained until the end of their lives.38 However, the judgment imposed three key proce-
dural requirements on the Vinter post-conviction review. 
First, an adequate mechanism must be in place at the time when the sentence of life 
imprisonment is imposed. Thus a prisoner serving a life sentence is entitled to know, at 
the outset of his or her sentence, what must be done to merit consideration for release, 
and under what conditions, including when a review of the sentence will take place or 
when an application for such a review can be made.39
Second, the mechanism should allow for a global review of whether there continues 
to be sufficient penological justification for the detention of the individual. In this way, 
the Court prohibits the lifelong pre-determination of a person’s capacity for atonement. 
There must therefore be:
…a review which allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the 
life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made 
in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be 
justified on legitimate penological grounds.40
36 Murray v. the Netherlands.
37 Vinter and Others, § 106.
38 Ibid. § 108
39 Ibid. § 122. 
40 Ibid. § 119.
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Third and finally, a mechanism guaranteeing a review should take place no later than 
25 years after the imposition of a life sentence, followed by further periodic reviews.41 
Within that framework, having regard to the margin of appreciation accorded to States 
in matters of criminal justice and sentencing, it is not the Court’s task to determine the 
form, whether executive or judicial, of the review process, nor when exactly it should take 
place.42 However, it can be expected that since only those offenders who have committed 
the most egregious crimes are given life sentences, it is highly unlikely that their release 
will be justifiable after only a few years.43 
The reason I think it is important to analyse these components of the Court’s case-law 
is that they provide insights into the broader framework of analysis adopted by the Court 
when enforcing its dignitarian conception of Articles 3 and 5 of the Convention, requir-
ing particular safeguards when it comes to the release of persons deprived of their liberty. 
I make three points in this respect.
My first remark relates to the requirement that the procedural review mechanism be 
in place at the moment the life sentence is imposed. It seems to me that the nature of this 
requirement is in direct conformity with the overarching rationale of the Court’s criminal 
justice case-law where, due to the primordial penological ground of rehabilitation, the 
offender must immediately be put in a situation where he can foresee the steps he needs 
to take in the long run to maximise his prospects of release, thus allowing him reasonably 
to adopt an attitude of atonement and betterment, to demonstrate that he or she does not 
pose a further risk to society.44 For a life sentenced prisoner, that is naturally an extended 
process, but one which requires, as a starting point, that he retains the ‘right to hope’, 
as worded eloquently by my former colleague, the Irish judge Ann Power-Forde, in her 
widely cited concurring opinion in Vinter. 
It is interesting to note that the consequences of the Court’s heavy reliance on the 
principle of the rehabilitation of prisoners, as developed in European penal policy, were 
perhaps not readily apparent when Vinter and Others was decided. Nonetheless, in sub-
sequent cases it has become clear that the requirement that rehabilitation form the fun-
damental basis of a dignitarian conception of individual human rights under Article 3 
presents the member States and the Court with certain challenges.
In the recent Grand Chamber judgment of April 2016 in Murray v. the Netherlands,45 
the Court was confronted with the claim that even if the applicant’s life sentence was de 
jure reducible, in other words that a possibility of release had been created, de facto he 
41 Ibid. § 122.
42 Ibid. § 120.
43 Van Zyl Smit, Weatherby and Creighton 2014 p. 78. 
44 According to the Grand Chamber (Vinter and Others [GC], § 122), it would be ‘capricious 
to expect the prisoner to work towards his own rehabilitation’ were the case to be otherwise.
45 Murray v. the Netherlands.
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had no prospect of release as he had never been provided with psychiatric treatment and 
the risk of recidivism would therefore continue to be considered high.
The applicant in Murray had been convicted and sentenced to life in prison for mur-
dering a six year old girl. Suffering from a pathological disturbance, which required treat-
ment, the applicant nevertheless did not receive any psychiatric or psychological treat-
ment in the prisons where he served his life sentence. Relying on Vinter and Others,46 the 
Court in Murray considered that:
even though States are not responsible for achieving the rehabilitation of life prisoners 
… they nevertheless have a duty to make it possible for such prisoners to rehabilitate 
themselves. Were it otherwise, a life prisoner could in effect be denied the possibility of 
rehabilitation, with the consequence that the review required for a life sentence to be re-
ducible, in which a life prisoner’s progress towards rehabilitation is to be assessed, might 
never be genuinely capable of leading to the commutation, remission or termination of 
the life sentence or to the conditional release of the prisoner.47
The obligation to offer a possibility of rehabilitation therefore entails, according to the 
Court, a ‘positive obligation to secure prison regimes to life prisoners which are compatible 
with the aim of rehabilitation and enable such prisoners to make progress towards their 
rehabilitation’.48 As the prison in which the applicant had served his sentence had failed 
to provide such a regime, his life sentence was not de facto reducible and a violation of 
Article 3 of the Convention was found.49
The unanimity of the Grand Chamber’s conclusion in Murray manifests in my view the 
Court’s firm stance on the principle of rehabilitation as the underlying doctrinal founda-
tion for its Article 3 based dignitarian conception of individual rights. Thus this case-law 
which rejects the imposition of life sentences that are irreducible in law and in fact not 
only affects the member States’ choices in the field of pure penal policy, but also has im-
portant implications for resource allocation within domestic prison systems. Indeed, the 
jurisprudence requires member States to move away from a pure custody-based, non-re-
habilitative system of incarceration of human beings, towards a human dignity-oriented 
system where every individual must be put in a position to be able to make independent 
46 Ibid. § 103.
47 Ibid. § 104.
48 Ibid.  § 104.
49 Ibid.  § 125.
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choices, with the assistance of prison personnel and experts, so as to fulfil the criteria 
required to be released at a future date.50
On that note, I will now turn to my second remark on the requirements of Vinter 
post-conviction review. As mentioned above, Vinter and Others requires a global review 
of whether there continue to be sufficient penological justifications for the detention of 
offenders. In post-Vinter cases, the Court has made clear that this assessment:
must be based on rules having a sufficient degree of clarity and certainty … and the 
conditions laid down in domestic legislation must reflect the conditions set out in the 
Court’s case-law … Thus, a possibility of being granted a pardon or release on compas-
sionate grounds for reasons related to ill-health, physical incapacity or old age does not 
correspond to the notion of “prospect of release” …51
It is important to note that the Court has not, as of yet, said in clear terms that post-con-
viction review should be of a judicial nature. This is an interesting element to be con-
sidered when analysing the Court’s case-law on deprivation of liberty, penal policy and 
proportionality, as usually, when a person is deprived of his liberty, Article 5 of the Con-
vention requires under its fourth paragraph that the detained person be afforded the op-
portunity to put his case to a judge who has the power to release him if the conditions for 
detention are not met. This is the famous legal principle of habeas corpus, a constitutional 
safeguard in most, if not all, member States of the Council of Europe.
However, the Court has not relied on an Article 5 § 4 type review in the Vinter context 
of life imprisonment, a doctrinal move that has been criticised by academic commenta-
tors. The Court’s main argument on this issue, which is based on its decision in Kafkaris 
v. Cyprus of 2011, is that ‘the review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention required 
under Article 5 § 4 is incorporated in the conviction pronounced by the courts’.52 Therefore, 
no further judicial review is required. Although the Court has thus considered, noting 
that the relevant European standards do not exclude such a review, that administrative or 
executive review mechanisms can be in conformity with a post-conviction review under 
Vinter and Others, the Court has discounted some types of executive decision-making, 
for example, the power of presidential clemency.53 However, it has done so not because 
50 Ibid. Murray v. the Netherlands, § 117; James, Wells and Lee v. the United Kingdom, appl. 
nos. 25119/09 57715/09 57877/09, 18 September 2012, § 209.
51 Ibid. Murray v. the Netherlands, § 100.
52 Kafkaris v. Cyprus (dec), appl. no. 9644/09, 21 June 2011, § 61.
53 László Magyar v. Hungary, appl. no. 73593/10, 20 May 2014, § 58. 
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of the executive nature of the review as such, but because of various shortcomings in the 
procedure itself.54
It goes without saying that I am not in a position to comment on the Court’s view that 
executive decision-making suffices under Article 3, as the issue is now before the Grand 
Chamber in the post-Vinter and Others case of Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom55 which 
will be decided soon. The theoretical element of interest to me for the purposes of this ar-
ticle is whether this part of the Court’s case-law can be reconciled with the Court’s overall 
doctrinal and dignitarian conception of individual rights under Article 3, as outlined in 
this article. I have two observations to make in this respect.
First, one might pose the question whether access to judicial review is, in and of itself, 
required by the principle of human dignity, either under Article 3 or under the depriva-
tion of liberty provision – Article 5 of the Convention. In other words, does access to a 
judge implicate a dignitarian conception of human rights, or is it rather a manifestation 
of procedural due process – or, going further, a pure issue of the separation of powers 
in a democracy? Frankly, my answer would be that I find it conceptually difficult to di-
vorce these elements from one another. At least on some level, procedural due process, as 
conceptualised in the ability of a detained person to have access to an independent and 
impartial judge, can be seen as an element of a dignitarian conception of rights retained 
by individuals in a democratic society. 
My second point is that it is not readily apparent why a Vinter review under Article 
3, where a prisoner must be afforded a periodic assessment of whether legitimate peno-
logical grounds justify his continued detention, is qualitatively or normatively different 
from the proportionality-based assessment of habeas corpus under Article 5, which is 
also subject to an arbitrariness review.56 The Court’s recognition in Vinter and Others that 
the balance of justifications for detention can continue to shift57 implies that, once the 
penological justifications for continued detention no longer suffice, detention of an indi-
vidual becomes disproportionately severe. In that sense it might perhaps be argued that 
the underlying logic of a post-conviction Vinter review under Article 3 is based on the 
principle of proportionality, in a similar manner to the detention review under Article 5 
of the Convention. 
If one accepts that the clear and fundamental purpose of a Vinter review is to deter-
mine the legality of continued imprisonment,58 it might be argued that one needs then 
54 See the recent case of T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary, appl. nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14, 4 
October 2016, § 49.
55 See the Chamber judgment, Hutchinson v. the United Kingdom, appl. no. 57592/08, 3 
February 2015.
56 See Mooren v Germany [GC], no 11364/03, 9 July 2009, §§ 72-81.
57 Vinter and Others, § 111.
58 Van Zyl Smit, Weatherby and Creighton 2014 p. 77.
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to address the question of the possible applicability of Article 5 § 4 to the review of life 
sentences.59 Without stating a conclusive viewpoint on this issue, as that would be inap-
propriate at this stage for a serving Strasbourg judge, I would just note that, first, it has 
been suggested by academic commentators that by applying the requirements of Article 
5 § 4, a Vinter review would have to be of a judicial nature, propped up by procedural 
guarantees, such as adversarial proceedings with a hearing as appropriate. Applicants 
would be entitled to legal assistance and to adequate facilities and time allowing them 
to properly prepare their submissions. Where the review does not lead to release, there 
should be a possibility for the matter to be reconsidered after a fixed, reasonable period.60 
Second, it has also been argued that since Vinter and Others is an undeniable authority 
for the statement that a point may be reached where it is no longer acceptable to detain 
someone, the argument from Kafkaris v. Cyprus, mentioned above, that ‘the review of the 
lawfulness of the applicant’s detention required under Article 5 § 4 is incorporated in the 
conviction pronounced by the courts’61 and that no further review is therefore required, 
seems open to debate.62 As I have already stated, I will not propose a substantive view on 
these arguments; suffice it to say that they certainly merit considered reflection.
My third and last point, as regards the Vinter review and the dignitarian conception 
of human rights which I have attempted to elaborate and apply throughout this article, is 
the territorial scope of the Court’s jurisprudence in this area. As is well-established, the 
Court has historically, ever since the landmark judgment in Soering v. the United King-
dom63 of 1989, applied Article 3 extraterritorially, meaning that a member State can be 
held in breach of the Convention if it subjects a person, for example by deportation or 
extradition, to a real risk of Article 3 type treatment in another country, irrespective of 
whether the receiving State is a Convention country or a third country.64 
In the 2014 Chamber judgment in Trabelsi v. Belgium,65 the Strasbourg Court found a 
violation of Article 3 because the applicant, if extradited to the US, would likely face a life 
sentence upon conviction without the possibility of parole. The Court thus deviated from 
its previous case-law in the judgments of Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United King-
59 Ibid. p. 77.
60 Ibid. p. 77.
61 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, § 61. It should also be noted that in Kafkaris, this finding was based 
on the premise that the ‘determination of the need for the [life] sentence imposed on the 
applicant did not depend on any elements that were likely to change in time’, see § 59.
62 Van Zyl Smit, Weatherby and Creighton, supra n 12, at 76.
63 Soering v. the United Kingdom, no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989. 
64 Ibid. § 91.
65 Trabelsi v. Belgium, no. 140/10, 4 September 2014. 
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dom66 of 2010 and Harkins and Edwards v. the United Kingdom67 of 2012. Most of the ap-
plicants in these cases had been threatened with extradition from the United Kingdom to 
the United States, where they faced prosecution for Al Qaeda-inspired acts of terrorism 
and, in the event of conviction, were liable to mandatory or discretionary life sentenc-
es. In the previous judgments of Babar Ahmad and Harkins, both handed down before 
Vinter and Others, the Court held that the applicants, who had not been convicted, much 
less begun to serve any sentence imposed, had not shown that in the event of extradition 
their incarceration in the United States would not serve any legitimate penological pur-
poses.68 It deemed it still less certain that if that point were ever reached, the US author-
ities would refuse to avail them of the available mechanisms to reduce their sentences.69
In Trabelsi, the Government invited the Court to uphold the approach adopted in 
Babar Ahmad and Harkins70 as it considered that Vinter and Others did not change 
things.71 The Government relied on the fact that as the applicant had not been convicted, 
Vinter and Others did not apply, since the starting point for determining conformity of 
the sentence with Article 3 was conviction.72 The Court in Trabelsi rejected this argument 
because, according to the Court, it in effect obviated the preventive aim of Article 3 in 
matters concerning the removal of aliens.73 It thus proceeded with applying the so-called 
Soering real risk test to the applicant’s case, finding that the procedures in the US did not 
provide for a review mechanism requiring the domestic authorities to ascertain, on the 
basis of ‘objective, pre-established criteria’ of which the prisoner had precise cognisance 
at the time of imposition of the life sentence, whether, while serving his sentence, the 
prisoner had changed and progressed to such an extent that continued detention could 
no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds.74
The Trabelsi judgment has been criticised somewhat by certain governments for 
transposing European human rights requirements to non-Convention states,75 not a nov-
66 Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom, nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 36742/08, 
66911/09 and 67354/09, 10 April 2012.
67 Harkins and Edwards v. the United Kingdom, nos. 9146/07 32650/07, 17 January 2012.
68 Babar Ahmad, §§ 243 and 244; ibid. Harkins, §§ 140, 142. 
69 Babar Ahmad, § 243; Harkins, §§ 140, 142.
70 Trabelsi v. Belgium, § 104.
71 Ibid. § 109.
72 Ibid. § 129.
73 Ibid. § 130. 
74 Trabelsi v. Belgium, § 137.
75 In the context of the case itself, see Judge Yudkivska’s concurring opinion where it is 
argued that ‘we cannot impose on the rest of the world the evolution of European standards’.
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el criticism I might add.76 It is interesting to note that the Grand Chamber Panel reject-
ed the Belgian Government’s request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber.77 
However, on 11 January next year, the similar case of Harkins v. the United Kingdom 
will be heard in the Grand Chamber after it was relinquished by the First Section of the 
Court where I sit.78 The issue of the extraterritoriality of the Vinter case-law may then 
possibly be clarified at the level of the Grand Chamber. As I sit in the Grand Chamber 
composition in Harkins, I will only make a brief remark concerning this issue from the 
perspective of the binary paradigms of the dignitarian conception of Article 3, on the one 
hand, and the justificatory conception of the same provision, on the other, both of which 
I have examined above. It seems clear that the argument made by governments in this 
regard is, in part at least, based on the idea that Article 3 must be subjected to some kind 
of relativisation in the extra-territorial third country context so as not to frustrate State 
sovereignty or intra-state relations and cooperation in the field of criminal justice. How-
ever, the argument relied upon by the Fifth Section in Trabelsi is rooted in the absolute 
nature of Article 3 protections and the dignitarian conception of individual rights which 
forms the basis of the Vinter and Others jurisprudence. It remains to be seen whether 
the Grand Chamber of the Court considers that there are strong arguments in favour of 
making an exception to Vinter and Others in the context of third country extraditions 
and deportations. 
4. Conclusion
When the judgment in Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom was delivered on 9 July 
2013, I had, just three weeks previously, been elected a judge of the Strasbourg Court. Let 
me confess that my first reaction to the judgment was not positive. Having been a nation-
al practitioner and academic for many years, dealing with Convention issues, I feared 
that the Strasbourg Court might, again, have strayed a bit too far in its interpretation of 
the Convention and, in particular, in restricting legitimate democratic decision-making 
in the field of penal policy and criminal justice. However, as I hope to have explained in 
76 See, for example, the reaction of the then UK Home Secretary, Theresa May, to the 
Strasbourg Court’s ruling in the Othman (Abu Qatada) case that the UK could not lawfully 
deport Abu Qatada to Jordan because of the risk that evidence obtained by torture would 
be used at his trial (Othman (Abu Qatada) v. the United Kingdom, no. 8139/09, 17 January 
2012; see also Lord Rodger’s statement in the UK House of Lords that ‘the idea that the 
United Kingdom was obliged to secure observance of all the rights and freedoms as interpreted 
by the European Court in the utterly different society of southern Iraq is manifestly absurd’ 
(Al-Skeini and Others v. Secretary of State for Defence [2007] UKHL 26, § 78).
77 Grand Chamber Panel’s decisions - February 2015, Press Release, 17 February 2015.
78 Relinquishment in favour of the Grand Chamber in the case of Harkins v. the United 
Kingdom, Press Release, 13 July 2016. 
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this article, my views on the judgment have evolved after considered reflection. If one is 
faithful to the text of Article 3, and its underlying rationale, rooted in a dignitarian and 
individualistic notion of human rights, it is in my view difficult to argue for a contrary 
position in the field of penal policy and imprisonment of human beings. I appreciate of 
course that some may think that the Strasbourg Court is overly idealistic in this area, 
too comforting to criminals, and failing to give due regard to those that are the victims 
of crime. However, the Court, through Vinter and Others and other judgments, simply 
requires that all persons, deprived of their liberty, including those serving life sentences, 
be treated in accordance with their intrinsic worth and humanity. They must be granted 
an opportunity for rehabilitation and to a realistic prospect of release. They must not be 
made objects of the State or suffer purely the wrath of the populace. The inherent human 
capacity for self-betterment, so strongly valued by the Convention system, cannot be 
wilfully ignored, no matter the judgement society makes of their actions, and no matter 
the temptation. 
